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Hegel
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (/ˈheɪɡəl/;...; August 27, 1770 – November 14, 1831) was a German philosopher and an important figure of German idealism. He achieved wide renown in his day and, while primarily influential within the continental tradition of philosophy, has become increasingly influential in the analytic tradition as well.16 Although Hegel remains a divisive figure, his canonical stature within Western philosophy is universally recognized. Hegel's principal achievement is his development of a distinctive articulation of idealism sometimes termed "absolute idealism",17 in which the dualisms of, for instance, mind and nature and subject and object are overcome. His philosophy of spirit conceptually integrates psychology, the state, history, art, religion, and philosophy. His account of the master–slave dialectic has been highly influential, especially in 20th-century France.18" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geist Dialectic Method |Reddit:/CriticalTheory/What is your view on [[Tristan Tzara]'s quote "The dialectic (...)>] |u://ronaldinjo> "What is your view on Tristan Tzara's quote "The dialectic is an amusing mechanism which guides us / in a banal kind of way / to the opinions we had in the first place"" |u://kinderdemon> "It is a standard Tzarism, he was the lone nihilist among the Dadaists, and at a great intellectual distance from them as a result. They thought art and philosophy were bunk because they failed in their cultural task, he thought they were bunk because everything is bunk. As such, it is not surprising that he takes a fully nihilistic view of dialectical thinking, but take a grain of salt and consider he is the one returning to the position he started with." |u://video_dhara> "Ha, like what you did at the end there. I might add that Dadaism performs a dialectic in its own right, and that he's pointing out the faults in an ersatz dialectics that would try to hide ideology behind a veneer of philosophical rigor. Ostensibly the aim of dialectics, Socratic, Hegelian, what have you, is to displace a "given" argument with one that, through consideration of its opposite, forms a new "truth" that replaces the old. But I think dada, at its best, preserves the negativizing function of hegelianism, on the basis that change is only possible through negation, through devouring the given circumstances and coming out the other side with something fresh. There is a suggestion (or perhaps it's outright, my memory isn't too clear) in Hegel, that the operation of consciousness is pure negation. This was ultimately the goal of dada. Devour it all, and let the antithesis have something excremental about it (there's definitely an affinity to the scatological in any dialectics, materialist or otherwise). The downside, or failure of dada, might then have been that once you've taken the shit, the flushing is in the hands of others, and for whatever reason, many in whose toilet the shit fell chose to let it sit there. It's no coincidence that the white walls of the bowl bear a resemblance to the white walls of the gallery." |Reddit:/AskPhilosophy/Question on Hegel's dialectic> |u://yyiiii> "Why, upon recognizing the individuality of the other, does Hegel's being-for-self automatically understand the other as a threat which it must stake its life in order to destroy? This passage specifically is giving me trouble: The presentation of itself, however, as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself as pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is not attached to any specific * existence,* not to the individuality common to existence as such, that is not attached to life."" |u://PrurientLuxurient> - (expertise in history of German idealism, Hegel, history of contemporary cont.) "It doesn't really recognize the other as a threat, it's just that its particular self-understanding is that it is pure being-for-itself (reflexivity, self-consciousness) that can do without any kind of being-in-itself (spatiotemporal existence, simple unreflective being), so it wants to demonstrate that its self-understanding is true and that it is "not attached to any specific determinate existence Dasein." Both parties in the encounter try to prove that they are all being-for-itself and not at all being-in-itself. In this case I think it's pretty much safe to understand the distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself as a version of the mind/body distinction. At this stage in the text, "natural consciousness" (I'll use this as shorthand for the protagonist of the Phenomenology) understands itself as truly a mind whose body is negligible. In the encounter with the other, it tries to prove this by staking its bodily existence--showing that its bodily existence is not its truth. It is not in fact true that natural consciousness can do without its bodily existence, however, which is why the "fight to the death" must not end in death. If natural consciousness dies, then it loses its being-for-itself and becomes all being-in-itself (a corpse)--in other words, it loses what it understands to be its truth. If the other dies, then the other loses its being-for-itself as well, and in losing its being-for-itself the other loses the capacity to recognize natural consciousness as having being-for-itself as its truth. So natural consciousness doesn't want the other to die either, because if the other dies then natural consciousness loses the recognition that certifies that it is truly being-for-itself. This is really heavy on Hegel jargon, so feel free to ask me to elaborate if any of this is unclear." Category:Philosophers Category:Philosophy Category:Germany Category:Europeans Category:Modern History Category:Marxism Category:Politics Category:Idealism Category:Materialism